



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

primary reasons for the adjournment of the Colombian Senate without ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty:

1. The first was purely political. Vice President Marroquin had succeeded the defunct Dr. Sanclemente as President of Colombia, and it was feared that, should he receive ten millions of dollars, he would either perpetuate himself in power or make his son, Don Lorenzo, his successor. The opposition in the Senate was headed by Dr. Miguel Antonio Caro, who had preceded Sanclemente and intended to succeed Marroquin. His followers, the Caristas, were in the majority, but they only desired to delay matters until the advent of Dr. Caro, less than a year later. They wanted to spend the ten millions.

2. The second reason was internal. It was argued that the cession of territory was unconstitutional, but the Caristas proposed to consume the necessary time in procuring an amendment to the constitution. This may have been merely an excuse.

3. The third reason was international. In the state of uncertainty that prevailed, the impatience of President Roosevelt manifested itself. The "big stick" was wielded, and Minister Beaupré, at Bogota, was cabled to inform the Colombian Government that it would amend the treaty or delay its ratification at its peril. Perhaps it was not possible to do this diplomatically. At any rate, the edict went forth, and the Senate, as any other self-respecting body would have done under the circumstances, adjourned *sine die*. The "intimidation or threats" were ours!

The writer knew Colonel Roosevelt personally—was under deep obligations to him, and told him once that if he would stick to his California speech: "I took the Canal Zone!" because he thought it necessary, but would approve the pending Colombian treaty as he had approved the Root-Cortes treaty, which differed only in degree—he would be the greatest man in America, as he already was in the United States. Unfortunately, great as he unquestionably was, he lacked one public virtue—magnanimity!

HENRY ROWAN LEMLY.
(Captain, U. S. A.)

Washington, D. C.

THE CHARGE DEFENDED

SIR,—I am obliged to your correspondent for correcting my English. After reading his defense and eulogy of the Colombian politicians, I see that "blackmailers" is altogether too mild, polite, and inexact a word for them. A political ring, like the Caristas, which refused to ratify this Treaty because they hoped that by putting off ratification to the next year, they, and not Marroquin and his ring, could divide the ten million dollars spoils, is fortunate in finding Captain Lemly to defend it.

Captain Lemly has not stated, however, that the Colombians forced the postponement in order to foreclose in 1904 the concession to the French, which was to run till 1910. By thus tearing up their sworn and signed contract, for which the French had already paid them, these Colombians counted on making twenty-five million dollars, in additional spoils, plus the value of the work the French had already done in digging the Canal.

Captain Lemly refers derisively to my supposed ignorance of other Treaties. My ignorance can not be defended, but I must protest against any American officer, wearing the uniform of the United States Army, suggesting that the American agents at Geneva—Charles Francis Adams, Judge E. R. Hoar, and Bancroft Davis—were in any way comparable with the ringsters at Bogota, who, according to his own statement, regarded the Treaty as a means to their private spoils.

I have read the despatches to and from Mr. Beaupré and Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt. If Captain Lemly read them, too, their dates and contents must have strangely changed between my reading and his.

On inquiry and by consulting *Who's Who?* and other sources of information, I find that Captain Lemly, U. S. A., was for twelve years Director of the National Military School at Bogota. The Colombian Government gave him a commission as Colonel, and presumably paid his wages. It also made him Commissioner General for Colombia at the World's Columbian Exposition. Have we a right to infer, therefore, that he is not prejudiced *against* the Colombians?

Of Captain Lemly's final shot at Roosevelt's lack of magnanimity, we must agree to differ.

He says that the Panama Question is insufficiently known. He is right. The Colombians and the lobby at Washington which has so industriously pushed the bill for paying Colombia twenty-five million dollars, have consistently tried to make the American public forget the rights and desires of the Province of Panama. This Province for fifty years did not wish to belong to Colombia, and it repeatedly strove to win independence from Colombia, with which it had neither common interests nor common principles. When the American Colonies strove for their independence, France helped them. Why should not the United States have helped the Panamanians in their struggle?

And now we propose to present the Colombian Government with twenty-five million dollars. The most it asked in 1903 was ten million. Having found that, in their blackmailing scheme, they had overreached themselves, they sent General Reyes to Washington with an offer to sign the Treaty for eight millions. Mr. Wayne MacVeagh, who was attorney for Reyes and Colombia, told me that they would have taken five. From five millions to twenty-five millions represents the unearned increment which an industrious and persistent lobby can give to a transaction of this kind.

WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER.

Magnolia, Mass.

WHY IT STANDS ALONE

SIR.—The July and August issues of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW appear to me to afford striking justification for the comment which I hear from intelligent men and women of my acquaintance—who seek truth and not simply a smug confirmation of their cherished opinions—that THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW stands almost alone among American magazines in the force and directness of its editorials and articles on current affairs.

I am moved to offer some comment upon this comment, because,